The COP is Almost Over,
But the Final Outcomes Are Still Unclear
I am writing about COP27, the major international climate conference in Egypt, on the afternoon of Friday, November 18, 2022. As its name suggests, it’s the 27th in a series of conferences—held every year except for 2020, during the early phases of the pandemic; these are run by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), bringing together all the nations of the world to reach agreements on how to address climate change.
Though the conference is scheduled to end today, it will surely run past its deadline, as previous COPs have. And, like other COPs, many actors take firm stands, both from sincere concerns and goals and from the wish to stake out positions so they give as little ground as possible. Countries issue statements, directly or obliquely, and many other civil society organizations are present, even if they do not directly negotiate. The UNFCCC publishes some draft documents, and many participants write on blogs and Twitter, so it’s possible to get some sense of where things are headed. Here are some point:
The 1.5°C warming limit is much debated. We’ve already had 1.2°C of warming, and would need to make utterly heroic efforts to stay within 1.5°C. Moreover, the Paris Agreement never set it up as a form limit; instead, it spoke, in characteristic diplomatic ambiguity, of limiting global warming to well below 2°C and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C. So there has been much attention at the COP to whether there will be recognition that the world will likely pass 1.4°C by some point in the 2030s. Nonetheless, it’s important to keep up ambition, so many speak of “keeping 1.5°C alive.” Feelings are very strong on this issue.
Finance. The poor countries that suffer the worst impacts, but have contributed little to emissions, need money to shift to renewable energy and to adapt to climate (and to the item in point 3). Will the wealthy countries provide the funds? There are many debates about the total amount that should be spent, about the form in which funds should be allocated (grants vs. loans, for example), about the specific institutions and funds that should transfer them, and about the governance of those institutions and funds. Not easy.
Loss and damage. This has been emerging as the third pillar of climate action, along with mitigation and adaptation. This is, in essence, climate reparations—payments for harms that can’t be undone. It was proposed in the late 1990s by small island states, and an earlier COP, in 2013, created an “Implementation Mechanism” to address it, though wealthy countries have blocked requirements to pay for this area. But things are changing, and it seems likely there will be progress here.
Participation. With the positive elections in Brazil and the US, Lula and Biden came to the conference and gave encouragement. Brazil joined with Congo and Indonesia as the three major tropical forest nations (in South America, Africa, and Asia) to sharply reduce deforestation, for example. And the US Inflation Reduction Act was welcomed. But the leaders from China, India, and Russia did not attend. A serious gap since they are delaying reducing emissions, and their commitments are crucial. They have played a role in previous COPs, which spoke of “phasing down” coal rather than “phasing out” coal. They are taking some steps towards decarbonization, but these are smaller than what is needed. However, civil society groups are stronger each year. At least—something very important—the US and China are talking again.
Details. COP-watching is a sport of its own. To give only one example: one of my friends and colleagues is negotiating on agreements on adaptation. An early draft spoke of “transboundary risk”. If climate change increases drought risk in the US Southwest, reducing flow in the Colorado River, and creating the need for adaptation in that region, that risk spreads across the boundary to Mexico, which is part of the Colorado River watershed and used to receive more water from it. But that entire category of risk—think of the Rhine, the Nile, the Ganges, the Mekong, the Amazon—is now not mentioned in the key adaptation text. Or perhaps it will be brought back in at the last minute. It remains to be seen.
All eyes on 2023. This COP, though important, is a prelude to the much more significant COP next year. This will be the “First Global Stocktake,” reviewing how much—or how little—the world has succeeded in meeting its powerful pledges in the Paris Agreement. A major assessment on energy, land use and emissions, on adaptation, on finance—with justice, and loss and damage included as well. So much of what is happening in this COP is setting up the parameters for COP28 and the global mins.
I went back on Twitter to follow Simon Evans (he’s the one I most rely on) and saw that John Kerry, the key US negotiator, just tested positive for Covid. And the key loss and damage text got watered down again, with vaguer wording about who will pay what, and pushing the start date for a key fund to 2024, after the mins. But he also is showing that African voices are stronger (and this is an African COP, taking place in Egypt) so it will be harder for developed countries to deny the claims from that continent.
It’s close to sunset. Shabbat shalom. We will know more in the coming days.